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The conventional model of a team sports league is based on
the North American major leagues which have a fixed number of
members, entry is rare and only granted by permission of the
incumbents (the closed system). European soccer leagues operate
a system of promotion and relegation, effectively permitting entry
on merit to all-comers (the open system). This paper examines the
impact of openness on the incentive of teams to invest (expend
effort) and share resources (redistribution) in the context of a
Tullock contest. The main conclusion of the paper is that openness
tends to enhance effort incentives, but diminishes the incentive to
share income [JEL Codes: L83, P51].
L’analisi economica tradizionale dei campionati sportivi a
squadre si basa sul modello “chiuso” nord-americano, dove vi è
un numero prefissato di squadre in lizza per il titolo. Il modello
europeo è invece “aperto” in quanto consente l’entrata di nuove
squadre tramite un sistema di promozione e retrocessione. Questo
lavoro propone un confronto tra un campionato “chiuso” e uno
“aperto” utilizzando modelli di tornei à la Tullock. I due sistemi
sono confrontati in base alle loro capacità di fornire alle squadre
incentivi agli investimenti (ad esempio nel talento dei giocatori) e
alla redistribuzione delle risorse tra i partecipanti al torneo. Le
principali conclusioni sono due. Rispetto ad un sistema “chiuso”,
un campionato “aperto” fornisce maggiori incentivi ad investire
mentre ha una propensione più bassa alla redistribuzione delle
risorse.
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SAGGIO AD INVITO1. - Introduction
The structure, conduct and performance of professional sports
leagues have been the subject of vehement criticism on both sides
of the Atlantic in recent years. In the US the major leagues in
baseball, basketball and American Football have been described
as “classic, even textbook, examples of business cartels”
1 and
several articles have enumerated abuses of local monopoly power,
in particular the extraction of public subsidies for the construction
of stadiums and their facilities (see e.g. Noll and Zimbalist, 1997;
Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). A key factor in these abuses is the
monopoly nature of the dominant league and the failure of entry
by rival leagues which have either folded (possibly due to
predation) or been co-opted (see e.g. Quirk and Fort, 1992). One
solution is the enforced break-up of the majors into competing
leagues, proposed by, inter alia, Ross (1989) and Quirk and Fort
(1999). An alternative is to adopt a system that generates entry,
not at the level of the league, but at the level of the team. Noll
(2002) analyses in detail the European system of promotion and
relegation, by which the worst performing teams at the end of
each season are demoted to the immediately junior league, to be
replaced by the best performing teams in the junior league. Ross
and Szymanski (2002) go further, and argue that the promotion
and relegation system would be welfare enhancing for US
consumers and taxpayers.
At the present time, however, the dominant European soccer
leagues that have long operated the system of promotion and
relegation are not in the best of health. Several teams in England
have fallen into administration, the UK equivalent of Chapter 11
2.
So frequent has this become that the league authorities have
introduced penalties for teams that go into administration
3. In
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1 FORT R.- QUIRK J. (1995, p. 1265).
2  Barnsley, Bournemouth, Bradford, Carlisle, Chesterfield, Crystal Palace,
Ipswich, Leicester, Lincoln, Luton, Millwall, Notts County, Oxford, QPR, Swansea
and Swindon have all gone into administration in the last 5 years. http://foot-
ball.guardian.co.uk/clubsincrisis/story/0,11737,816711,00.html.
3 http://www.terrier-bytes.com/articles.php/news/145.Germany the government has agreed to underwrite the losses of
the leading clubs due to losses of broadcast income
4 and in Italy
the lower house of the Parliament passed the salva calcio law
enabling the clubs to write off losses over a longer period than
is available to ordinary corporations
5. Critics of the soccer
administrators who have overseen the financial crisis in Europe
point to the extent to which redistributive measures, so common
in the US majors, are lacking in Europe
6. In the European leagues
there is no reserve clause, no draft, no roster limit no salary cap,
no luxury tax, no gate sharing and no collective merchandising
agreement. The only form of revenue sharing in European leagues
relates to the collective selling of broadcast rights, but even this
is absent in many leagues (e.g. Italy and Spain) and limited in
others (e.g. only 50% of broadcast income is shared in England).
These restraints, claim the owners of franchises in the US
majors, are desirable precisely because they promote a degree of
competitive balance in league competition and prevent rival
teams from falling into bankruptcy. Even critics in the US who
complain that these restraints are unnecessarily restrictive accept
that sports teams are special kinds of businesses in that the
bankruptcy of rivals, so welcome in most lines of business, is in
fact harmful to the remaining teams in the league
7.
In this paper we examine the relationship between rent
dissipation and the incentive to share revenues in closed and open
(i.e. open to promotion and relegation) league structures
8. We




6 See e.g. HAMIL S. et AL. (1999).
7 This observation, first noted in the economics literature by NEALE W. (1964),
has been acknowledged by all writers on sports economics since. Indeed, it is ar-
guable that the sports economics as a distinct field of research rests primarily on
this point.
8 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998) has identified the promotion and relega-
tion system as “one of the key features of the European model of sport”. In the
European system, all teams belong to a governing body that oversees a strictly de-
fined hierarchy of divisional competitions. At all levels a limited number of the
worst performing teams (usually between one and four) in any given division are
demoted at the end of each season to the immediately junior division, to be re-
placed by the equivalent number of top performing teams from the junior div-
ision. This seamless hierarchy connects the lowest levels of amateur competition
to the highest levels of European competition.
Promotion and Relegation, etc.model league competition in the context of an infinitely repeated
logit (Tullock, 1980) contest
9. The standard contest model involves
competition for prize every period (season) among a fixed number
of teams (as in a closed league). We extend this model to include
a penalty for coming last: relegation. In our model the teams are
divided into two groups (division one and division two). The teams
in division one compete in the current period for the main prize
as in the closed league (only with half as many competitors) while
the teams in division two compete for the opportunity to compete
in division one in the next period. In the next period the winner of
division two replaces the worst performing team in division one in
the current period (and this team then competes in division two). 
Using this model we examine two main issues: firstly, which
system gives the greatest incentive to invest in effort, and secondly
which system provides the greatest incentive to promote
competitive balance, meaning the closeness of the competition
between the teams in the league. We find that under plausible
conditions open leagues with promotion and relegation tend to
promote more effort than closed leagues, but undermine
incentives to share resources. Both of these issues lie at the heart
of public policy in relation to professional sports leagues. Antitrust
authorities have traditionally adopted a very lenient approach to
collective agreements between league members on the grounds that
a competitive balance is in the interest of the fans. However,
collective agreements can also undermine effort incentives and this
can be a particular problem in closed leagues
10. On the other hand,
the cost of extracting higher effort through promotion and
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9 Models based on Tullock contest success functions are standard to analyse
the properties and design of alternative contest structures (e.g. GRADSTEIN M. -
KONRAD K.A., 1999). See SZYMANSKI S. (2003) for a review of the application of
contest theory to sporting competition.
10 TAYLOR B. - TROGDON J. (2002) provide evidence that weak teams in the NBA
have in fact attempted to lose matches toward the end of the season, since losing
offers the chance of a better draft pick. Note that not only does the threat of re-
legation makes this strategy unrealistic for weak teams, but also that agreement
to implement a draft system is less likely to be feasible under promotion and re-
legation. It is worth noting that there is some loss of incentives to compete in a
promotion and relegation system if the bottom teams are not allowed to enter a
play-off for relegation - we are grateful for the editor for this point.relegation may be a reduction in competitive balance compared to
a closed league. 
Aside from its significance for the organization of sports
leagues, the idea of promotion and relegation has implications for
the optimal design of tournaments in general, e.g. procurement
auctions. It is well known that in most contest structures individual
effort is decreasing in the number of contestants (see e.g. Fullerton
and McAfee, 1999), but reducing the number of eligible bidders
makes collusion easier. If a principal holds regular auctions (as in
of the case with government agencies) it may make sense to create
an “A” list and a reserve “B” list and to allow promotion and
relegation between the two. This can ensure that bidders supply
optimal effort while minimizing the incentive to collude.
In the next section we discuss in more detail some
comparisons between Major League Baseball and English Soccer,
the archetypal North American and European sports leagues.
Section 3 analyses effort incentives in a symmetric model and
Section 4 examines revenue sharing in asymmetric contests.
Section 5 concludes.
2. - Some Comparisons between Major League Baseball and
English Soccer
The National League of baseball, founded in 1876, is the
oldest surviving team sports league in the world, and the English
Football League, founded in 1888, is the oldest surviving soccer
league. Each of these leagues became the template for the
organization professional team sports on their continent and while
rival leagues and team sports have generated organizational
innovations and differences, the similarities within North America
and Europe are much greater than those between the two
continents
11. North American leagues have many mechanisms for
the maintenance of competitive balance (e.g. roster limits, draft
S. SZYMANSKI - T.M. VALLETTI
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11 See HOEHN T. - SZYMANSKI S. (1999) for a comparison of the main institu-
tional differences.
Promotion and Relegation, etc.rules, salary caps, luxury taxes, gate and broadcast revenue sharing),
most of which are either unused or are implemented in less
egalitarian ways in Europe. By contrast, European leagues promote
rivalry not only through competition for the championship, but also
through competition to avoid relegation.
This can make comparisons difficult. For example, the most
widely used measure of competitive balance in North America is
the standard deviation of winning percentage (wpc) relative to the
idealized standard deviation (see e.g. Fort and Quirk, 1995)
12. On
this basis European Leagues can in fact look more balanced than
their American counterparts. Graph 1 compares the standard
deviation ratios for National and American Leagues (the two
leagues that comprise Major League Baseball and whose champions
contest the World Series) with the English Premier League
13 over
the period 1980-1999.
In fifteen out of the twenty seasons the Premier League had
a lower standard deviation ratio than either the National or
American Leagues, suggesting that competition within the season
was more balanced. Comparing the means, the average standard
deviation ratios for the National and American Leagues were 1.68
and 1.70 respectively, while that of the Premier League was 1.43,
significantly lower than either baseball league at the 1% level.
However, this measure tells us little about the dominance of
particular teams across seasons. Buzzacchi et Al. (2003) examine
the theoretical number teams that would be expected to reach a
given rank at least once by the end of a given number of seasons
and compare it to the actual numbers. For example, in any one
year only one team can have the highest winning percentage, but
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12 The idealised standard deviation is calculated on the assumption that each
team has an equal chance of winning, and is therefore equal to .5/√m where m is
the number of matches played by each team in the season. The extent to which
the actual standard deviation exceeds the idealised value thus gives some indica-
tion of the extent of competitive imbalance during the season.
13 The Premier League is the top division of English Soccer, it consists of
twenty teams and was formed by a breakaway from the English Football League
in 1992. Crucially, however, it retained the promotion and relegation relationship
with the First Division of the surviving English Football League. Currently three
teams are relegated and promoted between the two divisions each season. Seasons
up until 1992 refer to the old First Division of the Football League.in a perfectly balanced repeated contest among a fixed number of
teams the expected number of teams reaching this rank expands,
until eventually all teams will be expected to have reached it at
least once. In an open league with promotion and relegation this
number expands quite rapidly over time, given that more and
more teams have the opportunity to compete. Buzzacchi et Al.
therefore calculated these expectations for Major League Baseball,
taking account of franchise expansion, and for the English Premier
League taking account of the rules of promotion and relegation,
for a database covering the period 1950-2000. Graphs 2 and 3
compare the results.
The dotted lines in these figures tell us the expected number
of teams that would have ever entered the top five ranks of
winning percentage under perfect balance, starting from five
different arbitrary dates, while the unbroken lines show the actual
numbers. In the case of baseball, these lines are quite close
together, indicating that almost every team that could have
reached the highest ranks has actually done so, even if we consider
the most recent period, starting from 1990. 
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GRAPH 1
RATIO OF ACTUAL STANDARD DEVIATION OF WPC
TO IDEALIZED, 1980-1999, NATIONAL LEAGUE,
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GRAPH 2
EXPECTED (DOTTED LINE) AND ACTUAL (UNBROKEN LINE)
NUMBER OF TEAMS EVER ENTERING THE TOP FIVE RANKS 
OF WINNING PERCENTAGE IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
STARTING FROM 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 AND 1990
GRAPH 3
EXPECTED (DOTTED LINE) AND ACTUAL (UNBROKEN LINE)
NUMBER OF TEAMS EVER ENTERING THE TOP FIVE RANKS OF
WINNING PERCENTAGE IN ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE 
STARTING FROM 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 AND 1990If we compare the English Premier League, the gap between
statistical expectation based on equal chances and actual
performance is much greater. While similar numbers of teams
have entered the top five ranks as in baseball, openness through
promotion means that many more teams would have entered these
ranks if competition was truly balanced. For example, since 1950
over eighty teams would have achieved a top five placing in the
Premier League at least once, compared to just over thirty that
have in fact done so. Buzzacchi et Al. show that a similar pattern
is observed in other North American major leagues and other
European soccer leagues. 
One way in which we can account for these findings is that
the threat of relegation makes teams compete much more
intensively throughout the season, even if they are out of
contention for the title leading to a smaller ratio of standard
deviations within the season. However, over the longer term only
a small group of teams have access to the resources necessary to
mount a credible challenge for the title. Redistributive measures
in the major leagues ensure that more teams have the potential
to reach the highest levels, but for some reason European soccer
leagues are unable to implement such redistributive measures.
To  explore further the question of access to resources it is
useful to look at some economic financial performance data. Table
1 provides data for Major League Baseball teams for the 1999
season on wpc, attendance, payroll, revenues and estimates of
franchise values. One indicator that captures both the relative
inequality of resources and the struggle of the weaker teams to
survive under promotion and relegation is the share of income
devoted to payroll. The three teams with the poorest winning
records in both the American and National Leagues spent less
than the league average of 54% of total revenues on the payroll.
In the Premier League only one out of the seven worst performing
teams spent less than the league average of 60% on salaries.
Blackburn Rovers who were in fact relegated in this season, spent
more than 100% of their income on payroll. Perhaps most striking
is the following contrast: the top 15 clubs in baseball by wpc
devoted 58% of their aggregate income to payroll, compared to
S. SZYMANSKI - T.M. VALLETTI
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TABLE 1
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 1999
Team Wpc Attendance Player Revenues Franchise
mP ayroll $m $m Value $m
Atlanta Braves 0.63 3.28 79.8 128.3 357
Arizona Diamondbacks 0.61 3.02 70.2 102.8 291
New York Yankees 0.6 3.29 92.4 177.9 491
Cleveland Indians 0.59 3.47 73.3 136.8 359
New York Mets 0.59 2.73 72.5 140.6 249
Houston Astros 0.59 2.71 58.1 78.1 239
Texas Rangers 0.58 2.77 81.7 109.3 281
Boston Red Sox 0.58 2.45 75.3 117.1 256
Cincinnati Reds 0.58 2.06 38.9 68.4 163
San Francisco Giants 0.53 2.08 46.0 74.7 213
Oakland Athletics 0.53 1.43 24.6 62.6 125
Toronto Blue Jays 0.51 2.16 50.0 73.8 162
Baltimore Orioles 0.48 3.43 78.9 123.6 351
Seattle Mariners 0.48 2.92 47.0 114.2 236
Pittsburgh Pirates 0.48 1.64 24.5 63.2 145
Los Angeles Dodgers 0.47 3.10 76.6 114.2 270
Philadelphia Phillies 0.47 1.83 32.1 77.2 145
St Louis Cardinals 0.46 3.24 46.3 101.8 205
Chicago White Sox 0.46 1.35 24.5 79.5 178
Milwaukee Brewers 0.46 1.70 43.6 63.6 155
San Diego Padres 0.45 2.52 46.5 79.6 205
Colorado Rockies 0.44 3.24 72.5 102.8 311
Anaheim Angels 0.43 2.25 53.3 86.1 195
Tampa Bay Devil Rays 0.42 1.75 37.9 75.5 225
Detroit Tigers 0.42 2.03 37.0 78.1 152
Montreal Expos 0.42 0.77 18.1 48.8 84
Chicago Cubs 0.41 2.81 55.5 106.0 224
Florida Marlins 0.39 1.37 16.4 72.9 153
Kansas City Royals 0.39 1.51 17.4 63.6 96
Minnesota Twins 0.39 1.20 15.8 52.6 89
Total 0.50 70.10 1507.0 2773.7 6605
Payroll and revenue data from the Blue Ribbon report. Franchise values from 
Forbes.
only 49% for the bottom 15 clubs; in the Premier League the top
ten clubs devoted only 53% of their aggregate income to payroll,
compared to 68% for the bottom ten. 
The greater inequality of resources in the Premier League is
illustrated by the fact that aggregate income of the bottom ten
clubs equaled 35% of league income, compared to 43% for thebottom 15 in Major League Baseball. However, this difference in
inequality is not sufficient to explain the widely divergent pattern
of franchise values. The estimated franchise values for the bottom
15 in baseball equaled $2.7bn in 1999, 41% of the total for the
league. Franchise valuations are not available for all English clubs,
but by the late 1990s twenty English clubs had obtained a stock
S. SZYMANSKI - T.M. VALLETTI
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TABLE 2
PREMIER LEAGUE 1998/1999 SEASON
Team Rank Wpc Attendance Payroll Revenues Market
m$ m$ m cap $m
Manchester United 1 0.75 1.05 59.1 177.5 776
Arsenal 2 0.74 0.72 42.4 77.8
Chelsea 3 0.72 0.66 48.3 94.5 171
Leeds United 4 0.64 0.68 29.7 59.2 88
West Ham United 5 0.54 0.49 28.3 42.5
Aston Villa 6 0.53 0.70 26.6 55.8 90
Liverpool 7 0.51 0.82 58.0 72.4
Derby County 8 0.51 0.55 22.8 35.2
Middlesbrough 9 0.51 0.65 31.1 44.8
Leicester City 10 0.49 0.39 25.6 38.1 21
Tottenham Hotspur 11 0.47 0.65 34.7 68.1 102
Sheffield Wednesday 12 0.43 0.51 21.7 30.6
Newcastle United 13 0.46 0.70 39.2 71.5 152
Everton 14 0.42 0.69 32.4 40.7
Coventry City 15 0.41 0.39 21.1 30.2
Wimbledon 16 0.42 0.35 18.4 23.5
Southampton 17 0.39 0.29 18.2 21.5 18
Charlton Athletic 18 0.37 0.38 13.2 26.0 21
Blackburn Rovers 19 0.37 0.49 35.9 34.0
Nottingham Forest 20 0.30 0.46 18.9 27.2 27
Total 0.50 23.20 625.4 1071.4 1466
First Division quoted teams
Sunderland (promoted) 2 0.80 0.74 16.0 38.5 64
Birmingham 4 0.63 0.40 10.0 13.5 27
Bolton 6 0.61 0.35 16.1 20.2 43
Sheffield United 8 0.53 0.31 12.1 10.3 11
West Bromwich Albion 12 0.47 0.28 7.3 10.8 13
Payroll and revenue data from company accounts (reported in Deloitte and 
Touche Annual Review of Football Finance). Market capitalization at end of the
playing season.exchange listing and therefore we have data on their market
capitalization, and in 1999 five of these teams finished in the top
half of the Premier League and five in the bottom half. Those in
the top half accounted for 78% ($1.1bn) of the Premier League
market capitalization and those in bottom half accounted for only
22%, a much more uneven distribution of market valuation than
that of revenues. This can be accounted for by the fact that teams
in the bottom half are much more likely to face the threat of
relegation (as Noll, 2002, observes «demotion usually causes teams
to be worse off financially») while even if they avoid relegation,
they are much more likely to overextend themselves financially in
order to avoid the drop.
3. - Effort Contribution in Symmetric Contests with and
without Promotion and Relegation 
In this section we look at the value of the league and compare
the amount of effort that teams will choose to contribute in open
and closed leagues. Throughout we will assume that leagues are
essentially contests, where teams compete to win a single prize at
the end of each season. In a closed league, all teams have a chance
of winning the prize in the season. In open leagues, however, only
the teams present in the highest ranked division can win the prize
in the current season, and that the only incentive in lower divisions
is the prospect of promotion to the highest division
14. 
To fix ideas we begin by comparing the present value of a team
in an open and closed system assuming that each team always
faces an equal probability of success in their division. This implies
that teams have no choice in the level of effort or investment they
supply and that all such contributions are equal and normalized
to zero. In the second model, we make effort endogenous, although
again all teams are assumed to be symmetric in the sense that
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MAGGIO-GIUGNO 2005
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14 Note that this (European) concept of a division as part of the hierarchical
structure is therefore distinct from the American concept of a division. In the 
European system the concept of inter-divisional play within the League makes no
sense, since it violates the hierarchical ordering.equal spending produces an equal probability of winning the prize
and the prize is equally valuable to all teams. Asymmetries are
analyzed in Section 4.
3.1 Model 1: Symmetric Teams with Equal Winning Probabilities
(no effort) 
3.1.1 Closed System
Imagine n is the total number of teams. Every period there is
a contest and δ < 1 is the discount factor between periods. In every
period a team has a probability 1/n to win. The value of winning
the championship title (the prize) is normalized to 1. The present
discounted value of being in a closed league (C) is then simply:
V (C) = 1/[n(1–δ)]
Thus the value of the of participating in the closed league is
decreasing in the number of teams, since the probability of
winning the prize falls, and increasing in the discount factor.
3.1.2 Open System
Imagine the total number of teams is divided among k
hierarchical divisions, with n1 + n2 + ... + nk = n. Also, imagine
one team is promoted/relegated in every period. Call Vi the NPV
of being in division i. Then:
...
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Promotion and Relegation, etc.It is immediate to verify that ∑
k
i=1niVi = 1/(1–δ) = nV (C), i.e.
the total value of an open league (O) coincides with that of a
closed league, as long as the same total number of teams is
involved.
On the other hand, the distribution of the total value changes
quite dramatically. For instance if we have 4 hierarchical divisions,
with a total of 40 teams and δ = 0.8, then the above system can be
solved to obtain: V1 = 0.383, V2 = 0.0898, V3 = 0.0213, V4 = 0.00609,
while V(C)= 0.125. Equivalently, a team in the top division has the
same value “as if” it were in a closed league with approximately
only 13 teams (rather than 40). The equivalent number of teams in
a closed league increases to 56 for a team in the second division,
235 for a team in the third division and 821 for a team in the fourth
division! Obviously, the differences between the Vi’s decreases as the
discount factor gets bigger, and it disappears for δ equal to 1. 
In this simple benchmark model the only effect of promotion
and relegation is to change the distribution of team values. 
3.2 Model 2: Symmetric Teams with Endogenous Effort
Endogenizing effort requires us to specify a “contest success
function”. We use here the standard logit formulation adopted in
much of the literature (see e.g. Nti, 1997). If a team spends xi, the







parameter  γ is called “discriminatory power” and it defines the
sensitivity of win probabilities to differences in effort. If it is zero,
everybody wins with the same probability, no matter how much
effort is spent. Conversely, if it tends to infinity, the team that
spends more than its rivals wins with probability 1 (the contest
in this limiting case is equivalent to an “all-pay” auction). In an
open league system, the probability of winning is easily re-
interpreted as the probability of being promoted. However, for
open systems we also need a rule in order to assign a probability
of being relegated as a function of effort/investment relative to the
other contestants. For this purpose, we introduce a “contest losing
function” that gives the probability of arriving last in a contest:







Notice that the proposed losing function has a series of
desired properties:
— If γ is zero, the probability of arriving first or last is
independent from the effort put in the contest, si = li = 1/n for all
i’s;
— If γ tends to infinity, the team that puts the highest effort
wins with probability 1 and loses with 0 probability;
— For intermediate values of γ, if all the rivals of team i spend
the same amount, while team i outspends (respectively
underspends) the individual amount spent by rivals, then li < 1/n
(respectively li > 1/n);
— If team i puts zero effort, and all the rivals put some
positive effort, then si = 0, li = 1 and l–i = 0;
— If n > 2, then si + li < 1.
15
3.2.1 Closed System
There is no relegation. In a generic period, a team maximizes
πi = si – xi with respect to effort. This is a standard model, and it
can be verified that, at a symmetric equilibrium, per-period team
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15 This can be seen by noting that both si and li decrease with the number of
rival teams. Hence, the sum si + li is bounded above by the value it takes when






j) and si + li = 1.
Promotion and Relegation, etc.3.2.2 Open System
The model is as in Section 3.1.2, with the difference that team
i in a division j that contains nj teams now spends effort xij, in
which case its probabilities of winning the league and of being











maximization problem is therefore:
(2)
We  concentrate for simplicity on a league with only two
divisions. It is then possible to obtain the value functions from
(2), maximize with respect to effort taking as given the rivals’
effort, etc. to find at equilibrium:
To  ensure existence of equilibria in pure strategies it can be
shown that it suffices the restriction 0 <γ≤min [n1/(n1–1), n2/(n2–1)].
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one team in that league. With the exception of the case n1 = 1 (no
effort in the top league since the title is won with probability 1),
a team always spends more effort in the top league than in the
lower league, independently of the number of rivals it faces
16. Also,
if teams are distributed symmetrically, the difference between
efforts is independent of the discount factor and it amounts to γ
(n1–1)/n1
2>0. Despite spending more on effort, for δ < 1, the value of
a team in the top league is always higher than the value of a team
in the bottom league. The two values converge as the discount factor
gets closer to 1.
3.3.3 Welfare Analysis of Model 2
One question we might want to address is how to distribute
a total number n of teams between the two leagues. Welfare
analysis of sports leagues is in general problematic. Standard
consumer theory suggests that we should concentrate on the utility
of fans, but to reach any conclusions this would require us to
quantify the utility of competitive balance, own team success and
the quality of a tournament. It seems unlikely that policy makers
could agree on any unambiguous ranking of outcomes on this
basis. In the contest literature, welfare has generally been
identified with rent dissipation, meaning the extent to which the
profits from participation in the contest are consumed by the
effort contributions of the contestants, a measure we will consider.
In addition, we will consider the total amount of effort/investment
exerted in the contest. However, it is not obvious that aggregate
effort (which we might identify with the total quality of the
contest) is the right measure of welfare either. The whole point of
S. SZYMANSKI - T.M. VALLETTI
19
16 The difference is decreasing in δ, hence it takes a minimum for δ approach-
ing 1, in which case it is easily shown to be positive. Recall that we assume no pri-
ze at all in the lower league, which is probably not quite accurate. However, it is
true to say that, in practice, teams in lower divisions typically spend far less on
players than teams in higher divisions, but the gap is not quite so large as in our
model.
Promotion and Relegation, etc.the competitive balance literature is that it is the higher moments
of the effort distribution that count. In some contexts, moreover,
it may be that only the effort of the winning contestant really
matters
17. However, in a symmetric contest we can at least abstract
from the issue of inequality within each division, an issue to which
we will return in the next section.
We can illustrate the kinds of trade-off involved in promotion
and relegation by looking at total effort and effort levels per team
and in each division as the total number of teams increases.
Graphs 4 and 5 illustrate the case where the discriminatory power
of contest success function is moderate (γ =1). Along the horizontal
axis is shown the total number of teams in the league as a whole
(for example, 20 refers to either 20 teams in a closed league or
an open league with two hierarchical divisions — labeled Serie A
and Serie B
18 — of 10 teams each).
Total effort in the open and closed leagues are almost identical
for most league sizes, but inspection shows that this is because
teams make almost no effort in Serie B, while the ten teams of
Serie A contribute about as much effort as the twenty teams of
the closed league. This is quite clear in Graph 5, which shows that
the effort per team in Serie A is almost double that of the effort
per team in the closed league, while in Serie B effort contributions
are negligible unless there are a very small number of teams in
the division. Thus in this case the promotion and relegation system
seems to produce a contest of relatively high quality among the
elite of teams, while the closed system produces lower average
quality but spread more evenly among a larger range of teams.
Intuitively, relegation creates greater inequality between the teams,
so that for a fixed prize, the privileged (Serie A) contribute more
effort and the underprivileged (Serie B) do not try very much, but
the total effort is roughly the same as in a closed competition.
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17 SZYMANSKI S. (2003) points out that this is more likely to be true in indi-
vidualistic contests such as foot races, where great weight is attached to record
breaking, than in team sports.
18 These are the names of the top two divisions in Italy. This at least avoids
the somewhat confusing English situation where the second ranked division is now
called the Football League First Division, from which teams are promoted to the
Premier League.S. SZYMANSKI - T.M. VALLETTI
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GRAPH 6
TOTAL EFFORT IN MAJOR LEAGUE AND TWO 
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Number of teamsGraphs 6 and 7 illustrate the case where the discriminatory
power of the contest is low (γ = 0.1). First note that this
discourages effort (and rent dissipation) since the marginal returns
to effort are low. Graph 6 shows that total effort is now
significantly higher in an open league system and Graph 7 makes
it clear that this is because effort per team in the closed league
is not much higher in the closed league than in Serie B. Because
the contest is not very discriminating, there is little incentive to
make an effort to win, which is the only instrument providing
incentives in the closed league. In the open league, however, teams
in Serie A are also competing to avoid the drop, and this extra
incentive keeps effort levels per team much higher than in the
closed league.
Clearly, the objective of the teams (to minimize rent
dissipation) conflicts with the social objective of maximizing rent
dissipation. Thus, if the league members jointly determine league
policy,
19 they will opt for closed leagues when the discriminatory
power γ of the contest is low (recall that γ defines the sensitivity
of win probabilities to differences in effort) and open leagues when
the discriminatory power is high.
4. - Asymmetric Teams with Endogenous Effort
In the previous section we focused on the incentive to supply
effort, in this section we focus on the incentive to share revenues.
The justification for revenue sharing in sports leagues is
competitive balance — by creating a more balanced contest the
league will become more attractive to fans and will generate larger
league-wide profits (and welfare). This analysis presupposes
asymmetry in revenue generation between the teams — i.e. for a
given win percentage some teams will generate a larger income,
either because the club draws on a larger fan base or is more
intensely supported than other teams. However, revenue sharing
S. SZYMANSKI - T.M. VALLETTI
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19 In the next section we examine redistribution policies in an asymmetric
model, where we assume league policies require the consent of the strongest teams.
Promotion and Relegation, etc.requires agreement among the teams. In particular, teams that
enjoy a larger income absent revenue sharing must consent to a
redistribution scheme that will see their income fall relative to
weaker rivals. Another effect of revenue sharing that has been
widely commented on in the literature is its tendency to blunt
incentives (see e.g. Fort and Quirk, 1995), a factor which can make
revenue sharing attractive for the strong teams. In our analysis
we look for conditions where the larger revenue clubs would
willingly share income
20.
Suppose there existed four feasible locations (e.g. cities) for
a sports team, based on the drawing power of those teams. We
assume that each location can support only one team, while two
locations possess a greater drawing power than the others. In such
a universe a number of league configurations are possible. We
suppose either that all teams compete in the same championship
each year (the closed system) or that there are two divisions of
two teams each with promotion and relegation of one team from
each division each season (the open system). 
For tractability we assume that in the “no sharing” case this
means that the two weak teams have a zero probability of
winning any match against a strong team. Moreover, we assume
that whenever “sharing” occurs the teams competing with each
other have an equal probability of winning in that particular
contest. Our notion of sharing implies a significant restriction of
the strategy space of the teams (in the Appendix we develop a
model where more of the teams’ choices are endogenized). The
weaker teams will always want to share. We focus on the
potential benefit for the strong teams from sharing under closed
and open systems.
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20 We suppose that smaller revenue generating teams could never compel the
larger revenue generating teams to share, otherwise they would simply quit the
league and start a rival competition. In England, this is approximately what hap-
pened in the early 1990s - the top 5 teams led a breakaway from the Football
League (a venerable institution which had recently celebrated its centenary) on
the grounds that it no longer wanted broadcasting income, largely derived from
their own matches, to be shared with the other 87 members of the League. Having
failed to negotiate a significant increase in the share of the top teams, they per-
suaded 15 other teams to secede with them to form the FA Premier League.4.1 Closed League with Four Teams, no Sharing
A single prize is awarded to the winner of each contest. Since
weak teams never win in a contest against strong teams, they can
never win at all and so never contribute effort. Thus the four team
case is indistinguishable from a symmetric two team league.
Normalizing the value of the prize to unity, the effort levels and
payoffs to the strong teams (superscript S) in a closed league (C)
with no sharing (N) will be:
(3)
4.2 Closed League with Four Teams, Sharing
Now all four teams have an equal probability of winning every
season regardless of the effort they supply and so no team supplies
any effort. We assume that because the contest is now perfectly
balanced, this also enhances its attractiveness and therefore the
value of the prize, which is now assumed to be z > 1. Thus the
payoff to each player in a closed league (C) with sharing (S) is:
(4)
Clearly the total value of the league is increased by sharing,
but in the absence of side payments the strong teams will only
consent to sharing as long as (4)  is greater than (3), which
happens when z ≥ z
C = 2 – γ. This is true by assumption for γ≥
1, and may be true even for smaller values of γ. Note that, as is
true in many contest models of this type
21, a necessary condition
for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium is γ≤2. What this
section has shown is that the incentive to share revenues depends
on the potential gain from a balanced competition (z) and the
VC S
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21 BAYE M. et AL. (1994) developed the analysis of mixed strategies when γ >2 .
Promotion and Relegation, etc.discriminatory power of the contest. The latter matters because it
affects effort in the no-sharing case. In a highly discriminating
contest, strong teams will choose to expend high effort and thus
dissipate rents, making the sharing alternative attractive.
4.3 Open League with Two Two-Team Divisions, no Sharing
We assume that the worst performing team is relegated from
each division in each season and replaced with the best
performing team from the lower division. Again, with no sharing,
the weak teams can never win against the strong teams, can never
win the prize and so contribute no effort. The two strong teams
never meet in the lower division, but meet every other season in
the top division, and are then assumed to compete for the prize.
To calculate the optimal amount of effort, we need to identify
the value of each possible state for a strong team:
where V1
SS is the present value of a strong team currently located
in the top division with another strong team, V1
SW is the present
value of a strong team currently located in the top division with
a weak team and V2
SW is the present value of a strong team cur-
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level when team the two strong teams are in the top division, e
S
= γ(1 + δ)/4. The present value of the payoffs in the three states
are:
(6)
Given that a strong revenue generating team is always
promoted when in the second division and is relegated with
probability 1/2 when in the top division, in the steady state each
of these teams obtains V1
SS with probability 1/2, and V1
SW or V2
SW
with probability 1/4. Thus the steady state payoff to strong team
in an open league with no sharing is:
The difference between V
S(ON) and the closed league payoff
with no sharing (V
S(CN) from (3)) is γ (1 – δ), which is always
positive. Intuitively, the benefit to the strong teams of an open
league arising from the fact that they get to win easily 25% of the
time is exactly offset by the cost arising from not being in the top
division 25% of the time. However, in a closed league the strong
teams meet every season and so have to contribute effort every
season if they want to win, whereas in our stylized model a strong
team meets only weak opposition 50% of the time and on the
occasions have to make no effort at all. More generally, we might
expect that as long as the strong teams need to try less hard to
win when they play weak teams, then they will prefer the open
league system. The greater the discriminatory power of the
contest, the more effort is required when strong teams compete,
and the greater the benefit to the strong teams of the open system
(without sharing).
The setting for this result is somewhat extreme, given the
small number of teams involved and the assumed gap in
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Promotion and Relegation, etc.where the league divisions are larger and the gaps in abilities are
smaller as long as the weak drawing teams will contribute less
effort. In such cases relegation is always a cost to the strong team
that is relegated but a benefit to the remaining strong teams
amongst whom competition is relaxed
22. However, as we show in
the Appendix there can exist equilibria in an open system where
the weaker teams contribute more effort than the strong teams
(in order not to be relegated), and under these conditions the
strong teams may prefer a closed league.
4.4 Open League with Two Two-Team Divisions, Sharing in the
Top Division
We  begin by assuming that sharing only occurs in the top
division (competitive balance concerns are likely to be greatest in
the top division, and gaining the consent of the strong clubs will
be easier to obtain than when there is equal sharing across all
divisions). With sharing the present value of a strong team is
reduced compared to the closed league case, since relegated teams
miss an opportunity to win the prize. However, the strong teams











At the steady state the strong team is at the top with
probability 2/3 and at the bottom with probability 1/3.
23 Hence
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22 While the very best teams will not be relegated very frequently in a league
made up of a larger number of teams, it must be expected to happen at least oc-
casionally.
23 To  see this note that p1
S + p2
SW = 1, while the transition probabilities in the





S/2.the payoff to a strong team in an open system (O) with top division
sharing (S1) is:
(7)
Note that this payoff is larger than in a closed division and
equal sharing since the strong teams have the advantage of always
being immediately promoted whenever they are relegated, and
hence win the prize more frequently (i.e. one third of the time
rather than one quarter of the time).
If we now compare the strong team’s payoff to sharing in the
open system (OS1) to no sharing in the open system (ON), the
necessary condition for sharing to be preferred is found by
comparing (7) with (6), leading to:
z ≥ z
o = 3/2 –3γ(1+δ)/8
Recall that the equivalent condition for sharing to be preferred
in a closed league was z ≥ z
C = 2 – γ. For high discount rates the
critical value for z will be smaller in the open league, implying a
greater willingness to share on the part of the strong teams.
However, for lower discount rates it can happen that the critical
value to make sharing attractive in the closed league would not
be large enough to make sharing attractive in the open league.
For example, when γ = 1, sharing will be preferred in a closed
league for all z > 1, while if δ = 0.25 sharing is only preferred if
z > 21/16.
Equivalently, the comparison between the threshold values of
z tells us that revenue sharing is a more stringent condition in an
open league (z
O > z
C, i.e. revenue sharing is less likely to happen)
if γ > 4/5(5–3δ), that is to say if the contest is sufficiently
discriminatory.
This result is intuitive as the discriminatory power affects
profits only without revenue sharing (under our assumptions firms
do not react to z with any form of sharing, both in open and in
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Promotion and Relegation, etc.closed systems). Without sharing, the higher the discriminatory
power the lower equilibrium profits. Under CN a firm is competing
100% of its time, while under ON effort is exerted only 50% of
the time. It is thus clear that a higher value of γ, while making
sharing less appealing both in open and in closed systems, reduces
profits by more in the latter than in the former.
Our assumption, however, is very restrictive. In the Appendix
we show that, once we endogenize effort choices in an open league
with revenue sharing, the threshold that makes revenue sharing
attractive in an open league (z
O) increases, so that the range of
values of γ for which revenue sharing is attractive in a closed
league but not in an open league expands. If weak teams can end
up contributing more effort than strong teams (this can happen
because the penalty of relegation is higher: weak teams tend to
find it harder to get promoted again) then one of the main
attractions of the open system to the strong teams (namely, weaker
opponents) has vanished and they resist sharing.
4.5 Open League with Two Two-Team Divisions, Sharing in Both
Divisions
Each team has an equal probability of winning in each
division and no team contributes effort. Thus for any team:
V1 = [z + δ(V1 + V2)]/2,   V2 = δ(V1 + V2)/2
so that:
and the average payoff in an open system with sharing in both
divisions (S2) is:
(8)
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since teams compete for the top prize half as frequently but with
twice the probability of winning. As might be expected, this is
lower than the payoff to the strong teams when there is no lower
division sharing, so that strong teams will be less willing to share
if sharing is applied to both divisions. Comparing (8) with (6), in
an open league sharing in both divisions is preferred to no sharing
when z > 2 – γ(1 + δ)/2. Recalling that the equivalent condition
for a closed league is z > 2 – γ, it is clear that the critical value
of  z is always lower in a closed league. In other words, strong
teams will be less willing to agree to full sharing in an open league
than in a closed league. 
Thus in this section we have shown that under some
circumstances sharing can be more attractive in an open league,
but only when that sharing is limited to participants in the top
division. When there is sharing across all divisions, revenue
sharing is always less attractive in an open league than in a closed
league. 
5. - Conclusions
One of the most striking but least analyzed differences
between the (closed) American and (open) European models of
professional sport is the system of promotion and relegation. This
paper applies contest theory to the analysis of open and closed
league systems. 
We  find that a promotion and relegation system typically
enhances the incentive to contribute effort and hence to dissipate
rents, which may be considered an enhancement of social welfare.
On the other hand, promotion and relegation is also likely to
inhibit incentives to share resources. Redistribution in team sports
is frequently considered beneficial not only for the owners, since
the incentive to compete is weakened, but also for consumers,
who are said to prefer more balanced contests. To the extent that
this is true, promotion and relegation may reduce social welfare. 
Whatever the welfare implications, we argue that the effects
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Promotion and Relegation, etc.of promotion and relegation on incentives are broadly consistent
with what we observe on either side of Atlantic. In Europe, where
the system is applied, teams compete intensively — to the point
of bankruptcy in fact — and seem unwilling to share resources.
In the US, where the system does not apply, economic competition
is less intense and teams do share resources. While this paper
cannot be said to be the final word, we believe it points to a
potentially fruitful avenue for both empirical and theoretical
research.
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Consider an open league with four teams (two weak and two
strong) and two divisions. In this annex, we allow the weak teams
to be able to beat the strong teams in the top division, but only
if there is revenue sharing. We suppose that in the lower division,
where there is no sharing, the strong team always wins against a
weak team but has to supply some minimum amount of effort to
achieve this result.
(a) No Sharing
As weak teams never win against a strong team, we can
concentrate on the effort choice for the strong team. This is
derived from the following optimization problem:
This is basically the same problem as in Section 4.3, with the
only difference that the strong team has to supply some
(exogenous) minimum level of effort to win against a weak team
both in the top division (eH) and in the low division (eL). The only
endogenous effort is the one supplied against an equally strong
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Promotion and Relegation, etc.which is a simple generalization of (6).
(b) Sharing in the Top Division
The problem is considerably extended here compared to
Section 4.4. We now denote by z the gross value of the prize. Team
i of type h ={S, W} competing against a team of type k ={S, W}
in division d = {1, 2} puts effort e
hk











–id)γ]. The maximization problem
for the strong team is:
(A1)
We  are still assuming that, if relegated, a strong team wins
with probability one since it plays against a weak team, but has
to put in some effort e ∼
L to do so. On the other hand, the
endogenous efforts are those exerted in the top division against
an equally strong or a weaker team. Although there is sharing,
and teams in the top division are all competing for the gross prize
z, the efforts are not symmetric since firms are taking into account
the probability of getting to other states that do not give the same
payoffs to strong and weak teams. Hence we have to characterize
also the effort supplied by the weak teams:
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Hence we are endogenizing only the effort that a weak team
puts to win the title, while it puts zero effort when relegated and
competing without sharing against a strong team. To simplify
calculations, we also assume that, when in the lower division,
weak teams facing each other put an effort e ∼
W and win with
probability 1/2.
We  have solved the problems represented by (A1) and  (A2)
with respect to the three endogenous efforts. The expressions are
rather cumbersome and therefore we show only some numerical
examples below. Once the efforts are known, the expected value of
a strong team can also be calculated and compared to the expected
value it would get without any sharing. A strong team can be found
in one of the three following states: a) against a strong team in
the top division with absolute probability p
1S,  b) against a weak
team in the top division with absolute probability p
1W, c) against
a weak team in the bottom division with absolute probability p
2W.
Taking into account the transition probabilities between states, the
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Promotion and Relegation, etc.Finally, having obtained the equilibrium efforts and thus the








Graph A1 plots the solution for the following parameterization:
γ = 1, δ = 0.8, exogenous efforts eH, eL, eW all set to 0. The left panel
reports the expected value for the strong team against the value of
z: the dotted line corresponds to revenue sharing (OS1), while the
continuous line refers to the no sharing case (ON). Unless z is very
high, a strong team will never want to adopt revenue sharing. In
the right panel we compare efforts. Revenue sharing corresponds
again to the dotted lines: in particular the highest one is the effort
spent by the weak team, the middle and bottom lines plot the effort
spent by the strong team against a weak and a strong team
respectively. We can thus tentatively conclude that, for low values
of z, revenue sharing does not occur despite the effort spent is still
quite limited compared to no sharing: without sharing the strong
team benefits from zero effort to win against a weak team at the
top (this happens with probability 25%). Now, despite the “collusive”
effect of lower efforts with sharing and low values of z, when it
competes against a weak team at the top it has to put effort. This
effect of costly effort prevails and makes sharing dominated by no
sharing.
24 Only when z is sufficiently high, the higher expected gross
value of the prize compensates for the higher effort and revenue
sharing would be preferred by the strong team.
Another interesting observation from the diagrams is that,
under revenue sharing, the highest level of effort is actually put
by the weak team (although in the only state where it puts an
endogenous effort). The threat of relegation to the bottom, where
the weak team is not competitive when it meets a strong team,
means that it will fight very hard to remain at the top when it
happens to be there.
Recall that the equivalent condition for sharing to be preferred
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24 To  be more precise, one has to take into account also the probabilities of
realization of each of the three possible states, which are not shown in the Graphs.
Since efforts under revenue sharing are not “too” different from each other, it turns
out that they are in the range of 1/3 - see eq. (A3).in a closed league was z > 2 – γ. Given the parameterization in
the figure (γ = 1), this means that, in a closed league, revenue
sharing would always happen (z
C = 1) On the contrary, in an open
system, z has to be sufficiently high (z
O ≈ 2.15). Hence, once we
endogenize the effort of the weaker teams it becomes more likely
that the strong teams will reject revenue sharing in an open system
when they would accept it in a closed system.
By looking at other parameterizations, we can describe the
following tendencies: 
a) when the comparison is between an open league and a
closed league, the range of γ’s  that make sharing less likely in an
open league is now considerably expanded. For instance, under
the parameterization of Graph A1, the threshold value of z is
always more stringent in an open league (z
O > z
C) for γ > 0.3; on
the other hand in the main text the limiting condition reduced to
γ > 4/(5–3δ) ≈1.54 in this case;
b) similar results are obtained by putting reasonable values
for the various exogenous efforts; for instance if e ∼
W is positive (i.e.,
the effort put by the weak teams when they are both in the bottom
division), then the likelihood of revenue sharing in an open league
decreases even further. This is the intuition: the weak team —
when at the top — competes even harder to avoid relegation that
becomes a worse state, as a consequence the strong team has to
face a tougher rival when it shares at the top.
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GRAPH A1
EXPECTED VALUE OF A STRONG TEAM (LEFT PANEL) AND EFFORT
(RIGHT PANEL) IN AN OPEN LEAGUE WITH AND WITHOUT 
SHARING IN THE TOP DIVISION. PARAMETERS: γ=  1 ,  δ = 0.8
z
effort
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